This paper examines some of the beginnings of paradigm shifts in computer security.
What is this Paper About?
The workshop call for papers refered to shifts in computer security paradigms. The shifts, as we see them, are taking place along various "axes" of interest, among which are functionality, assurance, verification, and modeling.
Functionality.
A shift from one kind of security policy to many kinds, from single-policy systems to multiple-policy systems Assurance.
A shift from bundled to unbundled functionality and assurance; a shift away from equating high assurance with formal verification toward developing assurance by a combination of various methods.
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A shift from using only verification tools approved by the National Computer Security Center to vendor-developed tools and methods.
Modeling.
A shift from sta.te-ma.chine representation of internal rules of operation toward new forms and wider scope of modeling for secure systems.
Two questions focus our discussion of several formal models. It gets its requirements from an application environment-an -'A transform is a system function from UI x I x S into S, Ul is a set of userIDs, Z is the set of well-formed system requests, and S is the set of possible system states. A transform is secure when it is access secure, copy secure, CCR (container clearance required) secure, translation secure, set secure, downgrade secure, and release secure. The final point is an example of one way to extend the uses of modeling.
Have
We Extended The Uses Of Modeling?
We believe we have extended the uses of modeling somewhat-the instances we cited above are examples.
We will characterize the extensions we see, but, to start, we need a basis for identifying extensions. A generally familiar basis we can use is the BellLaPadula (Multics) model. We need also a framework for characterizing extensions. For this we can use the Williams-LaPadula taxonomy that we introduced last year at the Computer Security Foundations Workshop IV [lo] . The taxonomy identifies stages in the development of requirements for a trusted system, from objectives to detailed functional specification. The short form of the taxonomy is displayed in Table 1 . In Table 2 we have "located" the BLM and the four examples cited above, in chronological order from left to right. The way we have located each model is by markings in the stages that we think each model deals with. For each stage, the number of X's are a rough indication of the attention paid by the model on the particular stage; the greater the number of X's, the greater the focus of the model on the particular stage. Table 2 shows that we have extended the uses of formal modeling compared to the early days of trusted systems. Here are observations about what the tabulation tells us. The SMMSM and CWIM have much in common with each other and little in common with the BLM. One reason for this is that they both, but especially the SMMSM, avoid implementation dependencies.
And they place heavy emphasis on relating the computer policy to real-world activities.
They are application-oriented while the BLM is operating system-oriented. This is arguably a significant deficiency, not of the effort, which was constrained by time and budget, but of the resulting model if it were to be used for a real implementation and assurance assessment.
The research effort defined the ORGCON policy, stages 1 and 2 description, and prototyped it, for which t.he formal modeling effort (stages 4 and 5) provided design guidance for a particular implementation.
If we look at this in light of Table 2 , we can see that an implementation-independent formaliza,tion of ORGCON would require elaboration of the requirements at stage 3 while st.ages 4 and 5 could be eliminated.
One striking facet we see here is tha.t modeling is not just for assurance in the TCSEC sense. We think there is a tendency closely to couple formal models with assurance of that kind for t.rust,ed systems. In fact, a formal model may have not.hing to do wit,11 TCSEC-assurance but much to do with utilit,y, fuuctionality, correctness, or other aspects of an a,pplication or enterprise.
The implementa.tion-independent models in table 2, having no elaboration a,t levels 4 aud 5, are of this type. They natura.lly do not dea.1 with TCSEC-assurance that the comput,er will do what its FTLS says it will do, although, of course, they can lead to this through successive elaboration of requirement,s at the lower levels.
So, we think we can make a case for the usefulness of modeling that does not give an implementation and is not oriented toward TCSEC-assurance.
Then, looking at 
-Internal Requirements Model

-Rules of Operation
-Functional Design
An internal requirements model describes, in an abstract manner, how the system responsibilities given in the external model are met with the system. Rules of operation explain how the internal requirements developed in the model are enforced. A junctional design, like the rules of operation, specifies the behavior of system components and controlled entities, but is a. complete functional description.
4 Where Can We Go From Here?
We see two ways to extend the taxonomy we described earlier.
with customers, and data flow at the SmallTown Branch of BigCity Bank. The ent,erprise description gives the needed background for sta.ting the trust objectives for the enterprise. Another way to expand the scope of the taxonomy is to apply it to description and verification, in addition to modeling. Verification would demonstrate correct mapping of an (n-1)-stage elaboration to its successor n-stage elaboration. As an example of using the expanded scope, table 4 depicts the requirements of the TCSEC.
This expanded taxonomy can provide a common basis for various views of and proposals for paradigm shifts. As an example, several of the positions discussed in the "Fundamental Questions on Formal Methods" panel at the Computer Security Foundations Workshop V [12] are commented in terms of the taxonomy.
POSITION STATEMENT:
Formal methods of modeling and verification have failed to provide assurance-we need new ways to provide assurance.
COMMENT:
This position suggests that we may need to develop better descriptions and add more columns to the taxonomy table.
POSITION STATEMENT:
Formal methods would be more cost-effective if applied early in the definition of requirements.
COMMENT:
This position suggests that the best pay-off is in the upper rows of the taxonomy table.
POSITION
STATEMENT: Non-disclosure is the wrong policy to apply formal methods to; we need to start to deal with other policies that a.re relevant to the real world outside of DOD.
COMMENT:
This position suggests t.hat a. version of the taxonomy table may be needed for ea.& general policy of interest, with each version placing varying emphasis on the several st,a.ges and columns of the taxonomy.
POSITION STATEMENT:
Formal methods need to encompass applications and application softwa.re: it is here that the semantics of a trust policy for an enterprise are known.
COMMENT:
This position suggests tha,t empha.-sis should be placed in the upper rows of the taxonomy table (enterprise and objectives), while the orientation of the lower rows (int.ernal objectives/interface, functional design, hardware/software) should be , "shifted" a.wa.y from the reference monitor orientation toward design and assurance of application software and the support needed in the underlying hardware a.nd operating system.
Summary
The history of computer securit,y over the pa.st twenty years shows that just in t,he area of modeling, both formal and informal, pa.radigm shifGng ha,s been occurring slowly but significa.ntiy.
Using the Bell-LaPadula model of 1973 a.s a reference, we see that later models have dealt with other and more extensive areas of computer security requirement,s def-66 deling Design 6 -Hardware/Software Specification inition. The historical perspective suggests a taxonomy of requirements elaboration that spans the entire range from enterprise to hardware and software and has at least the dimensions of description, modeling, and verification.
Within this territory are many opportunities for research and development, in various directions as suited to different objectives. 
